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Sähkön toimitusvarmuus on riippuvainen tuotannon ja kulutuksen välisestä lähes 
täydellisestä tasapainosta. Tämän tasapainon ylläpito on kallis ja haastava vastuu, jonka 
kantaminen on perinteisesti kuulunut pitkälti sähköntuottajille. Verkon toimivuuden 
varmistaminen on edellyttänyt kulutuksen ja tuotannon ennustamisen riittävällä 
tarkkudella sekä tuotantolaitoksien kyvykkyyttä jatkuvasti säätää tuotantoaan 
vastaamaan kysyntää. Vaihtelevan tuotannon osuus sähköntuotannossa kasvaa 
jatkuvasti, mikä edellyttää säätökykyisen kapasiteetin lisäämistä. Tuotantokapasiteetin 
lisääminen säätötarpeiden kattamiseksi on taloudellisesti ja teknisesti epätehokasta, 
mikä on kannustanut vaihtoehtoisten säätökykyisten komponenttien kehittämiseen. 
Kun tavoitteena on kulutuksen ja tuotannon välinen taspaino, on samantekevää 
suoritetaanko säätö kulutuksen vai tuotannon puolella. Teolliset kuluttajat ovatkin jo 
vuosikymmeniä osallistuneet säätötoimenpiteisiin säätämällä kulutustaan. Kytkemällä 
pois kulutuskuormia voidaan pienentää tehopiikkejä tai jopa välttää kantaverkon 
kaatuminen. Näiden toimenpiteiden suorittaminen on taloudellisesti erittäin arvokasta, 
mikä houkuttelee säätökykyisiä kuluttajia tarjoamaan omaa kuormaa sille sopiville 
markkinoille. 
Suomessa ylläpidetään useita markkinoita joissa niin sähkön tuottajat kuin kuluttajatkin 
voivat kapitalisoida säätökykyistä kapasiteettiaan verkon tasapainoon ja sähkön 
riittävyyteen edistäviin toimenpiteisiin. Lisääntyvä tarve joustavuudelle sekä 
automaation kehittymisen myötä parantunut kyky valjastaa kuormien joustavuutta on 
herättänyt huomattavan määrän kiinostusta yhä pienempien kuormien 
hyväksikäyttämiseen näillä markkinoilla. Tämä työ pyrkii selvittämään minkä suuruiset 
tuottopotentiaalit eri markkainapaikat pystyvät tarjoamaan. Lisäksi työssä tutkitaan 
millaisia sivuavaikutuksia saattaa syntyä siitä, että kuluttajat säätävät kulutustaan 
markkinaehtoisesti, ja pohditaan miten nämä vaikutukset heijastuvat markkinoiden 
tilaan. 
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Abstract 
 
The security of electricity supply relies on maintaining a near perfect balance between the 
generation and consumption of electricity. Carrying out the procedures required to main-
tain this balance has largely been the responsibility of electricity producers, and can often 
prove to be technically and economically challenging. Ensuring the functionality of the 
grid requires sufficient forecasting of both generation and consumption, as well as the 
capability of electricity producers to alter their generation to meet demand. As the share 
of intermittent and variable sources of electricity continues to grow, the demand for flexi-
bility is exceeding the capacity provided by electricity generators capable of economically 
carrying out these tasks. Increasing production capacity explicitly for the purpose of 
providing balancing power is highly inefficient, which has sparked interest in developing 
alternative sources of flexibility. 
 
In the pursuit of maintaining the balance between generation and consumption, it is irrel-
evant whether the balancing procedures are carried out on the generation or consumption 
side. Industrial consumers have successfully participated in tasks related to security of 
supply and grid balance. By cutting off consumption loads, consumers can reduce power 
spikes, or even avoid a power outage. These are highly valuable procedures, which has led 
to an increasing interest among consumers to provide the flexibility of their loads to the 
relevant marketplaces. 
 
There are currently various markets in place which provide consumers and producers of 
electricity alike the possibility to capitalize on their ability to provide balancing tasks. The 
increasing demand for flexibility as well as technological developments which allow ever 
smaller consumption loads to be harnessed has encouraged previously unused resources 
of flexibility to participate in these markets. This paper aims to determine the profitability 
of various methods of demand side management, as well as determine the collateral impact 
the participation of consumers in markets may entail on both the electricity infrastructure 
as well as the markets themselves. 
 
Keywords demand-side management, frequency containment reserve, balancing power 
market 
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Abbreviations 
 
aFRR  Automatic frequency restoration reserve 
BRP  Balance responsible party 
FCR-D  Frequency controlled disturbance reserve 
FCR-N  Frequency controlled normal operation reserve 
MWh  Megawatt hour 
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1 Introduction 
 
The European commission has highlighted the pursuit of incorporating demand-based 
flexibility in various tasks related to the operation of a well-functioning electricity sector 
as a primary point of interest (European Commission 2013). The behaviour of consumers 
directly dictates the requirements set for the generation of electricity, and developing con-
sumption behaviour in a way that enhances the production of electricity is a valuable asset 
to the entire electricity sector. This paper aims to assess the services consumers are capa-
ble of providing under current market structures in Finland. The markets considered are 
the frequency containment reserves for normal operation, the frequency containment re-
serves for disturbances, the balancing power market and Elspot-based load shifting. 
 
Consumers’ aptitude to provide valuable services to the electricity sector are dictated by 
their ability to meet the technical requirements of each market. These requirements are 
reviewed in the first section of this paper. The potential willingness of consumers to par-
ticipate in these markets depends on the financial potential of the participation as well as 
the impact the management of consumption has on the consumer environment and con-
sumption component. The economic potential as well as the relevant factors in the for-
mation of prices in the markets are reviewed in the second section of this paper. Although 
the nature of the consumption component is not extensively considered under the frame-
work of this paper, the expected impact control cycles have on the consumers are consid-
ered assuming that certain universal factors are inherent to consumption loads. 
 
Finally, the impact of the provided control is considered for the probable forms of partic-
ipation. Consumers are inclined to utilize their consumption flexibility in a way that max-
imizes the financial profit received through the provided service. Consumption behaviour 
which provides the greatest financial profit does not axiomatically entail that this behav-
iour has provided maximal benefit to the electricity system as a whole. The impact anal-
ysis aims to provide insight to market inconsistencies which may contradict the pursuit 
of achieving the desired benefit of consumer participation in the relevant markets. 
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2 Basics of Electricity Generation  
 
In the pursuit of mitigating carbon emissions caused by the electricity sector, traditional 
thermal power plants will continue to be phased out, while intermittent power sources 
such as wind and solar power are increased. Concerns have been raised over whether this 
transformation challenges the foremost requirements of electricity generation of provid-
ing affordable power with maximum security. The functionality of the grid requires gen-
eration and consumption of electricity to be equal at all times. In order for this balance to 
be properly maintained, adequate control capability must be continuously available. Con-
ventionally, the electricity sector has relied on power generators’ ability to adequately 
manage their power output to ensure the availability of power and maintain the required 
balance within the grid. Increased integration of power sources incapable of sufficiently 
controlling their power output has required consideration over whether conventional 
methods will be competent in economically ensuring a secure supply of electricity. (Lund 
2015, Huber 2014) 
 
The functionality of an electricity grid requires nearly perfect correlation of demand and 
supply. In conventional terms, this means that electricity generators alter their output to 
match the consumer load. This requires large quantities of so called load matching power 
sources, which are able to manage their power production with minimal delay. Thanks to 
the abundance of hydropower in the Nordic grid, this task can be carried out fairly com-
fortably, as the technical properties of hydro power allow for explicit control without 
being economically inconvenient. Other power sources are considerably less fortunate. A 
rough representation of the properties significant in terms of power control are shown in 
table 1. 
  
Thermal 
power plant 
Combined cycle 
power plant 
Gas turbine Engine Nuclear 
power 
plant 
Typical nominal 
power 
     
Mwe 600-900 60-400 10-300 1-20 1000-1600 
Efficiency 
     
old 40 % 50 % 32 % 45 % 33 % 
new 47 % 60 % 38 % 48 % 37 % 
Activation 
times 
     
cold start 5-10 h 2-3 h 10 min 15 min 2 days 
warm start 3-5 h 1-1.5 h 10 min 15 min 1 day 
hot start 1.3-2.5 h 0.5-1 h 10 min 5 min 8-16 h 
Minimum 
power 
40 % 40-50 % 50 % 30 % (15-)30 % 
Power change 
rate 
3-6 %/min 4-6 %/min 5-10 %/min 25 %/min 
 
 
Table 1 
Flexibility properties of power plants (ÅF-Consult 2012) 
 
Thermal power generators are poorly equipped to deal with rapid changes in demand, 
particularly unexpected peaks that have not been sufficiently prepared for. Although gas 
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turbines and engines are technically more apt to fulfilling the required control, they are 
significantly more expensive, and due to their high cost, are investments that are likely to 
be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Nuclear power plants, especially traditional gen-
erator types, have very limited capability when it comes to managing their power output, 
and typically produce their nominal power output throughout the year, excluding mainte-
nance breaks. Traditional coal- and bio-fuelled power plants have a limited potential to 
control their output, and their applicability varies considerably, as there is a wide variety 
of existing power plant types. Under optimal conditions, thermal power can react within 
an hour’s notice. (ÅF-Consult 2012) 
 
Hydropower has significantly superior properties when considering the potential to man-
age power output, as shown in table 2. 
  
Hydropower Pump as turbine 
Efficiency 
  
old 87 % 66 % 
new 92 % 70 % 
Activation times 
  
cold start n/a 5-10 min 
warm start 1-2 min 30 sec 
hot start 1-2 sec 1-2 sec 
Minimum power 15-20 % 5-20 % 
Power change rate large large 
 
Table 2 
Flexibility properties of hydropower plants (ÅF-Consult 2012) 
 
Although the technical properties of hydro turbines allows excellent control potential, the 
availability of control is not trivial. In order for hydropower plants to be able to provide 
flexibility, they must have adequate water reserves available. This requires not only the 
physical capacity of the water reserve, but also the sufficient availability of water. Alt-
hough considerably more reliable than solar and wind, hydropower is also dependant on 
weather patterns, and its ability to provide power may be restricted due to unfavourable 
weather. Just as any other market participator, owners of hydro capacity aim to maximize 
the profitability of their power production. Storing large reserves of water for the sake of 
maximizing control capability is not in the best interest of the hydropower plant owner, 
as the payoff of retaining reserves is not a financially reliable practice. In addition to its 
reliance on the available water reserves, hydropower influences the water system that it 
operates in. The power output of a hydropower plant depends on the amount of water 
passing through its turbines, and rapid changes in power output cause corresponding fluc-
tuation in the water flow, which can be harmful to the surrounding environment. Mitigat-
ing the hydropower plants effect on the water system may inflict restrictions on its allow-
ance to rapidly alter its power output.  
 
As developments in the electricity sector call for increased flexibility, it is important to 
extend flexible resources beyond those currently available, and provide supplemental 
methods of providing ancillary services and ensuring energy security. In light of this chal-
lenge, consumers’ potential to take part in tasks related to security of supply has been a 
key point of interest in the designing of future energy systems. 
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3 Basics of the Electricity Market Participation 
 
All parties operating in the electricity market are responsible for operating in a way that 
ensures the proper functionality of the system as a whole. The electricity market is cur-
rently divided into hourly segments, which are prepared for individually. In principal, 
each party operating in the electricity market is responsible for maintaining its balance of 
production/procurement and consumption/sales. This is not achievable in practice, which 
is why market parties must have an open supplier, who is capable of ensuring the power 
balance for each market hour is achieved. Market parties whose open supplier is the trans-
mission system operator, in Finland’s case Fingrid, are referred to as balance responsible 
parties. They are required to provide Fingrid with a production and consumption balance 
for each hour. The balance responsible parties’ capability to provide reliable production 
and balance settlements is a key underlying factor in maintain the overall system balance. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Balance settlement structure (Fingid a) 
 
The primary marketplace in which market parties acquire electricity for their consumers 
is the Elspot market, which operates on a day-ahead basis. Bids are made to the Elspot 
market based on the prevailing forecasts for the following day, and the market is closed 
at 12:00 CET each day, after which trades are finalized. Forecasts of consumption and 
production are never perfect, and can change as the delivery hour approaches. In order to 
allow market parties to react to developments in forecasts, the Elbas market allows market 
operators to sell and procure electricity after the Elspot trading has been finalized, allow-
ing for previous errors made in forecasts to be compensated for. The Elbas market oper-
ates on a “pay-as-bid” basis, which means that trades are made directly between market 
operators once a mutual price is agreed upon. This means that there is no universal price 
for the Elbas market, but instead the price is independent for each trade made. For this 
reason the Elbas market is not covered extensively in this paper, as it is difficult to make 
assumptions on the compensation received. The Elbas market hour is active from the 
closing of the Elspot market to within 1 hour of the delivery hour. Balance responsible 
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parties are required to inform the transmission system operator of their final balances 45 
minutes before the operation hour. All market parties are inclined to follow the plans set 
in the production and consumption balances, as they are responsible for accounting for 
deviations from their balances by buying or selling imbalance power, which is likely to 
be financially unfavourable. A relative timeline of the main stage of electricity trading in 
Finland is visualized in figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Timeline of market participation in Nordic countries (Valtonen 2015) 
 
Despite the possibility to procure electricity up to one hour from delivery, unexpected 
events can often lead to circumstances which market parties are not capable of preparing 
for. In order to be able to adequately react to deviations from initial procurements of 
electricity, Fingrid manages the balancing power market, which allows balance responsi-
ble parties to sell and procure electricity within the operation hour. Market operators ca-
pable of providing balancing power can bid capacity to the balancing power market.   
 
The Elspot, Elbas, and balancing power market operate based on hourly total energies. In 
order to account for volatility within the operation hour, reserve markets provide a mar-
ketplace in which market operators can provide sources of frequency containment and 
frequency restoration. These reserves are responsible for accounting for the constant fluc-
tuation of consumption (and to some extent production) as well as rapid unexpected 
changes caused by technical disturbances in electricity generation or transmission com-
ponents. 
 
The quality of power is dictated by its ability to maintain a constant frequency. In the 
Nordic grid, the nominal frequency of the grid is 50 Hz, and maintaining this frequency 
is vital to the functionality of the grid as well as the proper operation of components 
receiving power from the grid. Various reserves are allocated to ensure that the grid fre-
quency is not jeopardized. 
 
The primary reserve resources follow guidelines that aim to contain the grid frequency 
within a certain threshold. These are referred to as frequency containment reserves, and 
in Nordic countries frequency containment reserves are further divided into two separate 
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reserves. The normal operation reserves (FCR-N) are responsible for accounting for the 
continuous minor fluctuation of the frequency, with the purpose of containing this fluc-
tuation to a maximum of 0.1 Hz. Disturbance reserves (FCR-D) are reserved for abrupt 
shortages in power, providing rapid reserves for periods in which the frequency drops 
below 49.9 Hz, with the intention of keeping the frequency above 49.5 Hz. 
 
Frequency restoration reserves serve the purpose of replacing the containment reserves, 
thereby ensuring the containment reserves are available for future use while concurrently 
recovering the frequency to its nominal value. Frequency restoration reserves are pro-
vided manually through the balancing power market. Additional automated frequency 
restoration reserves are procured through a recently implemented market, which began 
operation in August of 2016. Due to the lack of data for the aFRR market and the imma-
turity of the market, this market is not included in the framework of this paper. The fre-
quency containment and restoration reserves are pictured in figure 3. 
 
A summary of the markets considered in this study are shown in table 3. 
 
Market place Type of con-
tract 
Minimum 
size 
Activation 
time 
How often 
activated 
Frequency controlled 
normal operation re-
serve 
Yearly and 
hourly markets 
0,1 MW 3 minutes Constantly 
Frequency controlled 
disturbance reserve 
Yearly and 
hourly markets 
1 MW 5 s / 50% or 30 
s / 100% 
Several 
times a day 
Balancing power mar-
ket 
Hourly market 10 MW 15 minutes Several 
times a day 
Elspot market Hourly market 0,1 MW 12 h - 
 
Table 3 
Summary of market commodities included in the framework of this paper (Fingrid c) 
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4 Purpose of Flexibility 
 
Electricity consumption is often viewed from an energy standpoint, in which the under-
lying factor is the amount of watt hours consumed. What consumers often fail to take into 
account is that the requirements for producing electricity vary considerably based on the 
prevailing conditions. Electricity is procured based on the merit order effect, with priori-
tizes power sources based on their running costs. Renewables have near-zero running 
costs, as they utilize primary energy sources which are essentially free. Nuclear power 
plants are economically highly efficient in terms of fuel costs, and are therefore used 
essentially at all times. Other thermal power plants vary substantially in their economic 
efficiency, with CHP plants providing base-load power throughout the winter period and 
condensing and gas turbines providing supplemental generation based on the amount of 
demand exceeding the baseload production. When the overall demand for electricity is 
moderately low, this demand can be satisfied by the technically and economically most 
efficient power sources. However, a characteristic of the electricity market is that as de-
mand increases, the price tends to increase exponentially. An idealized merit order curve 
is shown in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 
Idealised representation of the merit order  
 
When electricity demand considerably exceeds the baseload production, the overall mar-
ket price tends to rise drastically, as increasingly expensive forms of generation must be 
deployed in order to meet the requirements of demand. In addition to their higher running 
costs, many of these peak power plants are utilized for only a minor portion of the year, 
weakening the profitability of the initial investment and upkeep costs. 
 
The majority of consumers pay for electricity based on the total energy consumed. This 
means that consumers pay the same price for their electricity regardless of the effective 
price dictated by the Elspot market. This leads to a misrepresented view in which elec-
tricity is a generic resource that is equally valuable unconcerned of when it is consumed. 
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Incorporating more accurate methods of electricity pricing for consumers would allow 
consumers to shift flexible consumption loads from periods in which expensive and un-
favourable forms of generation are required to periods during which ample amounts of 
economically efficient capacity is available, thereby enhancing both the technical and 
financial operation of the electricity sector. This method is covered in Elspot-based load 
shifting, in which consumers are assumed to pay for their consumption based on the 
hourly consumption and corresponding market rates of the Elspot market. 
 
In addition to peak consumption periods, there are various other circumstances in which 
the generation of electricity can bare a particularly large burden. As mentioned previ-
ously, the majority of power plants are limited in their ability to compensate for rapid 
changes in demand, requiring ample notice and time to adjust their power output. In order 
to ensure power security as well as grid functionality during unexpected conditions, rapid 
sources of flexibility are required, providing the ability to promptly offset the deviation 
in the production-consumption equilibrium. This task is covered in this paper through the 
participation in the balancing power market, which provides consumers the possibility to 
provide balancing capacity, capable of compensating for unexpected deviations that occur 
during the operation hour. 
 
The infrastructure required to perform tasks related to the transmission and distribution 
of electricity is extremely valuable, and is at risk of being damaged if the state of the grid 
is compromised. The economic consequences of grid failures and the resulting power 
outages are potentially enormous, and ensuring that the risk of these failures is minimized 
is of high priority to the transmission system operator. The transmission system operators 
of Nordic countries maintain frequency containment and frequency restoration reserves 
for the purpose of securing the quality of power is maintained at a satisfactory standard. 
Such reserves must be capable of reacting virtually instantaneously to frequency devia-
tions. These tasks present a demand for technically highly proficient flexibility, which 
most electricity generators are incapable of providing.  Forms of flexibility suited for 
carrying out tasks related to frequency containment are vital to the functionality of the 
grid, and are a highly valuable asset. 
 
As increasing amounts intermittent sources of wind and solar power are implemented, the 
demand for flexibility is expected to increase. Wind power generation causes fluctuations 
in the merit order curve, and is likely to cause larger variability in price differences. As 
the power output of wind power depends entirely on weather conditions, it is inherently 
susceptible to forecasting inaccuracies, and these errors require flexible components in 
order to offset the deviations from forecasted production plans. Concurrent phasing out 
of thermal power plants substituted by nuclear power decreases the flexible capability of 
the base load, transferring the burden of flexibility to be even more dependent on non-
generation based components.  
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5 Properties of flexible loads 
 
In terms of their consumption-related properties, components capable of demand-side 
management cover a virtually endless spectrum. A thorough review of the various con-
sumption loads is not within the framework of this paper, and only the necessary proper-
ties will be discussed. The consumption components simulated in the calculations are 
assumed to be ideal, therefore representing the theoretical maximum of the profit poten-
tial. 
 
The loads simulated in this paper are considered to be continually in use under normal 
operation, functioning at a nominal power consumption throughout the day. The loads are 
capable of cutting off their power consumption entirely for the duration of 1 hour. This 
would lead to an energy deficit in the consumption environment.  In order to ensure that 
the system that the consumption component is operating in receives the amount of energy 
it requires to function properly, this deficit must be compensated for by increasing the 
consumption of the component by the corresponding electricity amount at a later time. 
The process of increasing consumption in order to compensate for previously carried out 
load cut-off is referred to as the payback process. This process can also be done in reverse, 
wherein the initial control would be to increase consumption, resulting in an energy sur-
plus within the consumption system, requiring a subsequent decrease in consumption as 
the payback. 
 
When considering the operation of a consumer, it is adamant to keep in mind that the 
participation in markets should have as little of an impact on the consumption environ-
ment and consumption component as possible. Carrying out control cycles requires con-
sumption to deviate from its normal operation, which is likely to decrease the overall 
efficiency at which the component functions. These control actions may also have an 
impact on the consumption component itself, requiring additional maintenance and or 
decreasing its lifetime. The energy imbalance caused by the control impacts the consump-
tion environment, as the consumption system is no longer in its nominal state, which may 
have a variety of drawbacks, and in some cases entails risks to the consumer. 
Management of the energy balance of the consumption environment is one of the most 
critical constraints to the operation of a consumption component used for demand-side 
management. When considering optimal market strategies for the markets in which en-
ergy is traded, the Elspot and balancing power market, it is often beneficial to delay the 
payback period for extended periods. The delay of payback causes the load environment 
to maintain an energy imbalance for extended periods of time. Thermal loads providing 
either heat or cooling to the consumption environment are likely candidates for the per-
ceived control, and the impact control cycles have on these systems is considered when 
assessing the impact of control cycles on the consumer. When considering a load such as 
heating, an energy deficit may cause discomfort, as the initial load cut-off would cause 
the temperature of the environment to drop, with the temperature returning to its desired 
level once the payback has been carried out. Correspondingly, if a freezer were to provide 
flexibility services by decreasing its consumption, this would increase the temperature 
within the freezer, possibly putting the contents at risk of decreasing in quality. 
 
For Elspot based load shifting, the drawback of imbalances can be partially resolved by 
planning load shifts to entail an energy surplus or energy deficit based on which imbal-
ance is considered less of a hindrance. The profitability of load shifting is based on the 
ability to reduce consumption during high prices and acquire payback energy during low 
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prices. It is irrelevant whether the increase or decrease of consumption is carried out ini-
tially, providing the consumer with the option to experience an energy deficit (upregula-
tion first) or surplus (downregulation first) as its buffer based on which one it sees as less 
of an encumbrance. 
 
An energy deficit in a thermal system will often be considered a greater inconvenience, 
as it directly constricts the operation of the heating or cooling unit. Although an energy 
surplus would not cause this limitation, it does have drawbacks which must be considered. 
A thermal load consumes electricity primarily for the purpose of compensating for the 
amount of heat transfer occurring between the heater/cooler and its surrounding environ-
ment. This heat transfer is relative to the temperature difference between the cooler/heater 
and its surroundings. An energy surplus would mean that this temperature difference 
would be greater than under normal operation, thereby leading to higher losses through 
heat transfer. If the delay of payback is held off for long periods, these losses may lead to 
the load shifting becoming redundant. For consumers planning to participate in demand-
side management, it is crucial to be able to adequately manage the consequences of the 
various control operations, and develop market strategies which incorporate constraints 
aimed to ensure control cycles are profitable and do not prove harmful to the consumption 
system.   
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6 Review of literature 
 
Energiateollisuus Ry has coordinated a research project in which researchers from the 
Tampere University of Technology, Lappeenranta University of Technology and the 
Tampere University of Applied Sciences have collaborated in the pursuit of determining 
the potential of demand-side management in Finland (Järventausta 2015). Petri Valtonen 
of the Lappeenranta University of Technology has provided additional research on the 
utilization of consumption in the markets available in Finland (Valtonen 2015). These 
efforts provide the foundation for the research carried out in this paper. The intended 
purpose of the research carried out in this paper is to initially approach the concept of 
demand-side management from the consumer point of view. This allows the possibility 
to supplement the analysis of markets with constraints and relative factors determined by 
the consumer, and thereby provide additional insight to the expected participation of con-
sumers in the respective markets. 
This approach is fundamentally different to the literature reviewed, as rather than aiming 
to provided definitive evaluations of the financial potential of demand-side management, 
the intention of the analysis is to distinguish the factors which most significantly dictate 
the eventual profit. The motivation for this approach is that consumers are likely to vary 
in their technical capability as well as financial premise, which leads to a high uncertainty 
of the applicability of results if they have been achieved through generalization and ex-
tensive assumptions. By limiting the assumptions made of the nature of consumers and 
assessing the parameters which universally dictate their operation, this paper aims to pro-
vide the essential guidelines consumers require when assessing how they are able to uti-
lize their potential for demand-side management. 
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7 Technical requirements 
 
This section covers the technical requirements prescribed by the various markets. Con-
sumers are likely to be capable of carrying out various actions related to the management 
of their consumption. The consumer’s ability to capitalize on the potential of these actions 
is dictated by the suitability of the available flexibility to the technical requirements set 
by the marketplaces. These technical requirements are covered for each market separately 
with particular attention given to the assumption that the control is provided by a con-
sumption load. 
7.1 Frequency Containment Reserves for Normal Operation 
 
The most frequently utilized reserves are the frequency containment reserves for normal 
operation, referred to as the FCR-N. These reserves are utilized essentially continuously, 
and aim to keep the frequency deviation within 0.1 Hz. Each region in the Nordic power 
network is assigned an FCR-N capacity requirement, which the transmission system op-
erator is obligated to procure for each hour of the year. For the year 2016, the required 
FCR-N capacity for Finland was 140 MW.  
 
FCR-N operators are required provide symmetrical control, meaning that the bid capacity 
must be available for both up- and downregulation. This can prove to be a hindrance to 
many willing market participators, as the symmetrical control requirement would allow 
for a maximum of 50 % of the total load capacity to be bid. For example, a 10 MW load 
participating in the FCR-N market would initially be set to consume 50 % of its nominal 
power, thereby providing the potential to provide 5 MW of upregulating power an 5 MW 
of downregulating power, which would account for a 5 MW capacity bid. 
 
Thermal loads such as heaters and coolers operate at a fractional power rating by default, 
which allows them to avoid constraining the initial consumption, as the potential for 
downregulation (increase of consumption) is inherently available under normal operation. 
In fact, the symmetrical control serves as a benefit to thermal loads, which can be strin-
gently restricted in their capability to deviate from their energy balance, as the symmet-
rical control scenarios do not typically result in substantial deficits (or surpluses) in hourly 
energy consumption.  
 
Consumers have only recently begun participating in the FCR-N markets. SEAM, in col-
laboration with KWH Freeze and Fingrid, have utilized a freezer storage in the FCR-N 
hourly market, providing a 0.3 MW capacity for 8 hours each day since January 2015. 
(SEAM OY). Fortum has participated in the FCR-N market by aggregating the water 
heaters from 100 households. The pilot projects have demonstrated that consumers, spe-
cifically non-industrial consumers, are capable of meeting the technical requirements of 
the control required in the frequency containment reserves for normal operation. (Fortum 
OY) 
 
The entire capacity must be capable of activating with a maximum latency of 3 minutes 
once the deviation from the nominal frequency reaches 0.1 Hz. The control must be car-
ried out as linearly as possible with a maximum dead band of 50 ± 0.5 Hz. sufficient 
linearity is shown in figure 4, with the blue area showing the area within which the power 
output must be at grid frequencies between 49.9 and 50.1 Hz. 
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Figure 4 
Guidelines for FCR-N control (Fingrid d) 
 
The adequate functionality of an FCR-N component is verified by Fingrid through control 
tests, which determine the amount of FCR-N capable capacity. Once the capacity has 
been approved, it can be bid to the annual and hourly markets. All bids made to the FCR-
N market must be made for a capacity of at least 0.1 MW. The capacity bid to the market 
may consist of separate components which have been aggregated to meet the requirement. 
Allowing market operators to participate in the market with relatively small capacities is 
propitious for consumers, as consumption components are often small, and would thereby 
require aggregation of large quantities in order to meet higher capacity requirements. 
 
One of the main challenges consumers face in participating in FCR markets is in meeting 
the communication requirements set by Fingrid. In order to ensure adequate operation of 
reserves, Fingrid demands real-time data throughout the operation hour for which the 
reserve has been acquired. Operators responsible for FCR-N capacity are required to sup-
ply Fingrid with information on the amount of reserve capacity available at an interval of 
three minutes. In addition to the 3-minute data cycles which are delivered immediately, 
the market operator is required to measure and store per second data of the available active 
power, which can be used to verify the proper operation of the reserve in case there is 
reason to believe otherwise. The per second data must be kept available for 4 days. The 
requirements of data managements may prove to be a major obstacle to consumption 
loads consisting of many separate components, as this would entail extensive censoring 
and data aggregation in order to meet the data management requirements. 
7.1.1 Impact of Participation in FCR-N on Consumption 
 
Based on the guidelines set by Fingrid, a unit acting as part of the frequency containment 
reserves for normal operation could maintain its nominal consumption when the fre-
quency deviation is less than 0.01 Hz, and adjust its consumption linearly when the fre-
quency deviation is between 0.01 and 0.1. This would effectively minimize the consump-
tion deviation required from the component while remaining within the mandated guide-
lines. The relation between relative consumption to the bid capacity and the grid fre-
quency is shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5 
Consumption deviation for FCR-N control 
 
When frequency in the grid is greater than 50.01, the consumption of the reserve unit is 
increased, leading to an energy surplus within the consumption system. Likewise, when 
frequency is below 49.99, the component would consume less than its nominal consump-
tion, causing an energy deficit within the consumption system. The total energy imbal-
ance caused by participation in FCR-N control can be calculated through the following 
formula. 
∆𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∫ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
0
               (1) 
𝐶𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∫ 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑁
0
                                          (2) 
 
Where Capacity is the bid capacity, Deviation(frequency) is determined by figure 6, fre-
quency is the grid frequency at time t, and N is the number of time intervals. The energy 
Imbalance can be alternatively represented by a time coefficient Ctime, in which 
𝐶𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
∆𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
        (3) 
 A time coefficient of 1 thereby represents an energy surplus equivalent to 1 hour of ad-
ditional consumption at bid capacity, a time coefficient of 2 represents an energy surplus 
equivalent to 2 hours of additional consumption at bid capacity, and so on. A positive 
time coefficient denotes an energy surplus, and negative time coefficient denotes an en-
ergy deficit. 
 
Using frequency data for the 1st of January 2016, the minimum energy deviation caused 
by participation in FCR-N was calculated. For these calculations, a time interval of 1 
minute was used (𝑡𝑛 − 𝑡𝑛−1 = 1 minute), and the unit was assumed to be in use for the 
entire day (𝑁 = 1440). The frequency data is shown in figure 5, and respective energy 
deficit in figure 6. 
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Figure 6 
Minute-based grid frequency data 
 
 
Figure 7 
Energy imbalance within consumption system caused by participation in FCR-N control for the du-
ration of 1.1.2016 
 
Although the aggregate energy imbalance over the course of the day is relatively small, 
leading to an energy surplus equivalent to less than 1 hour of additional consumption of 
the bid capacity, the energy deviation can periodically be quite substantial, as extended 
periods of high or low frequencies are experienced. Consumers are likely to be restrained 
in their capability to deviate from their energy balance, which makes the energy deviation 
a critical element in determining a components ability to participate in FCR-N for con-
secutive hours. Long periods of high or low frequencies may lead to the consumption 
system buffer to exhausted, rendering systems incapable of offering the required control. 
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In order to provide further insight to the possible energy deviations, the daily energy im-
balances for the period of 1.1.2016-7.1.2016 are shown in figure 8, assuming that at the 
beginning of each day the unit was in its nominal state (𝐶0 = 0). 
 
  
Figure 8 
Energy imbalances within consumption system caused by participation in FC-N control for the days 
1.1.2016-7.1.2016 
 
Based on the period examined, participating in FCR-N control for several consecutive 
hours may lead to considerable energy imbalances. Acting as part of the FCR-N for the 
course 2.1.2016 would have led to a significant energy deficit, corresponding the cutting 
off of the entire bid capacity for nearly three hours. Over the course of 7.1.2016, the 
energy surplus caused by control participation corresponds to consuming additional en-
ergy at bid capacity for almost three hours. In order to ensure the capability of providing 
the required control, it may be appropriate to incorporate a constraint as to the maximum 
period a component is able to act in FCR-N control, after which the system would be 
returned to its nominal state. 
7.2 Frequency Containment Reserves for Disturbances 
 
Frequency containment reserves for disturbances are responsible for providing immediate 
upregulation in case the grid frequency drops below 49.9 Hz, ensuring that abrupt elec-
tricity deficits do not lead to power outages. Technical failures in power plants or grid 
components pose the risk of near-instantaneous drops in frequency, as power supply is 
unexpectedly lost. FCR-D must be capable of providing timely reaction to these events, 
requiring very rapid activation times. The required capacity for FCR-D for Finland varied 
between 220 and 265 MW in 2016. 
 
Frequency containment reserves for disturbances have the strictest requirement in terms 
of latency. The reserve is required to be able to fully activate within 30 seconds, with a 
maximum dead band of 50 ± 0.5 Hz. FCR-D reserves can provide control by aiming to 
provide linear control throughout the frequency range of 49.9 and 49.5 Hz. Unlike FCR-
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N, FCR-D is not required to provide downregulating capacity. The guidelines set by Fin-
grid for linear FCR-D are illustrated in figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
Guidelines for linear FCR-D control (Fingrid d) 
 
As an alternative to linear control, FCR-D can be executed by instantaneously providing 
the entire reserve capacity. In this case the reserve is activated based on the achievable 
latency. The latency requirements for instantaneous FCR-D are summarized in table 4. 
 
 
Frequency (Hz) Latency (s) 
< 49.7 < 5 
< 49.6 < 3 
< 49.5 < 1 
Although the technical requirements of FCR-D may give the initial impression that they 
are more demanding than FCR-N, for consumption loads this is in fact more often not the 
case. Despite requiring very fast activation times, the majority of loads are more suitable 
to the requirements of FCR-D compared to FCR-N, as they have they are inherently ca-
pable of nearly instantaneous power control. FCR-D does not require symmetrical con-
trol, which means that the ability to rapidly cut off power from the load is sufficient to 
meet the requirements. FCR-D is activated sparingly, as it is reserved for particularly 
problematic circumstances. Because of its high importance, FCR-D capacity is substi-
tuted by secondary reserves within 15 minutes of activation ensuring its availability for 
future use. This entails that the usage of FCR-D components is infrequent, and upon use 
the length of control is restricted to just 15 minutes. For these reasons, it can be assumed 
that the resulting energy deviation of participation in FCR-D are negligible. Consumers 
 
Table 4 
Latency requirements for non-linear FCR-D control (Fingrid d) 
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unwilling to significantly alter their consumption are likely to favour FCR-D, as the uti-
lization of the capacity is far less than FCR-N. 
 
The minimum capacity for the FCR-D markets is 1 MW. Although this is considerably 
higher than the minimum requirement for FCR-N, the technical requirements of FCR-D 
allow for a wider variety of components to be used, as it is not required to provide sym-
metrical control, and the linearity of control is not mandatory. Although most consump-
tion loads are likely capable of acting as part of the FCR-D, the same data management 
is required for FCR-D as FCR-N, obligating market operators to provide continuous data 
at three-minute intervals, as well as storing per second data. This may discourage the 
incorporation of a large number of separate components. 
7.3 Balancing Power Market 
 
The balancing power market is delegated to supplementing the frequency containment 
reserves in reacting to unexpected developments in the energy balance within the opera-
tion hour. Its main task is relieving the frequency containment reserves for disturbances, 
as it is vital to have these reserves available at all times. In the case of significant drop in 
frequency, FCR-D are the first to react, providing the primary control. Capacity bid to the 
balancing power market is procured based on the capacity required to restore the fre-
quency within the grid to its nominal value and allow the FCR-D capacity to be relieved. 
BPM participators are obligated to provide full capacity within 15 minutes of notice, 
thereby ensuring the maximum length of inadequate FCR-D capacity is constrained to 15 
minutes. Balancing power capacities can also be activated to provide a source of down-
regulation under circumstances in which there is a substantial surplus of electricity (pro-
duction > consumption). 
 
Bids are made to the balancing power market for upregulating and downregulating power 
separately. From the consumer point of view, upregulation (providing electricity to the 
grid) would be carried out by decreasing consumption, and likewise downregulation (re-
ceiving electricity from the grid) would entail the increase of consumption. Upon activa-
tion, the entire bid capacity would be provided within 15 minutes of receiving notice. The 
capacity would remain activated for the duration of the market hour unless separate notice 
of relieving the capacity is received. The uncertainty of the length of control is somewhat 
problematic for consumers, as the amount of capacity bid to the market must be assessed 
based on the magnitude of capacity available for the entire hour, although the realized 
length of control is likely to be less than this. In calculations made for the balancing power 
market, it is assumed that the length of control is 30 minutes. Despite the assumed control 
length, the capacity provided in bids made must naturally be calculated under the assump-
tion that the activation period may last the entire hour, and the consumer would be capable 
of providing the bid capacity for the entire hour. 
 
Currently, the balancing power market is operated manually, and participators receive 
notice of bid activation via phone call. Bids made to the BPM must be at least 10 MW, 
which is a challenge to demand-side management solutions, as meeting this requirement 
likely requires the aggregation of a large number of individual components. As the devel-
opment of markets to become more accommodating to consumer participation, it has been 
considered that the minimum bid capacity of the balancing power market would be de-
creased to 5 MW, which may lead to a greater amount of consumers capable of meeting 
the requirements of the market.  
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7.4 Elspot Market 
 
Under the framework of this paper, Elspot market based demand-side management is not 
approached from the electricity retailers perspective, in which case retailers would man-
age demand-side management capacity as a component in their Elspot trading. Instead, it 
is assumed that consumers are capable of procuring electricity at spot-market rates, and 
utilize this method of invoicing to achieve profits through load shifting. In this sense, 
there are no specific technical requirements of the control, other than the capability to 
decrease the consumption for a given hour and correspondingly increase consumption for 
the payback hour. In order to enhance the effectiveness of load shifting based on the El-
spot-market, it may be desirable to develop more sophisticated methods of carrying out 
the control of consumption. If such methods are incorporated, they may involve technical 
requirements, although it can be assumed that the participation of consumption in the 
Elspot market does not entail particular technical challenges. 
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8 Market overview 
In this section the markets are reviewed without taking into account the participation of 
the consumer. This section aims to introduce the nature of the markets and provide insight 
into the factors that influence the formulation of prices. The development of the markets 
is considered, as these developments may potentially significantly change the state of the 
market in the coming years. 
 
It is important to distinguish between markets in which energy is traded to markets in 
which the compensation is based on offered capacity. FCR-N and FCR-D markets are 
capacity-based markets, in which compensation is received based on the available power, 
whereas the Elspot and balancing power market are energy-based markets, in which the 
compensation is based on the provided energy. Understanding the requirements of each 
market as well as the nature of the commodities traded in these markets is critical in 
gauging capacity potential and determining optimal markets and respective strategies. 
 
When considering the responsibility of FCR-N and FCR-D operators, it is not necessary 
to provide the grid with up- and downregulation, but rather to provide the potential to 
supplying up- and downregulation. FCR-D and FCR-N are put in place to ensure the 
availability of flexibility whenever this flexibility may be required. Whether this potential 
is actually utilized is not entirely relevant, as the value of the reserves is in the insurance 
of the frequency maintenance. Essentially this means that the market participator receives 
the same compensation regardless of the extent of effective utilization of the provided 
capacity. This is not entirely true, as in addition to the capacity payment received through 
the market, an energy compensation is received. However, the concept of the market re-
mains the same, in that the desired product is capacity rather than energy. The demand is 
therefore determined by the power capacity requirement, with the energy compensation 
serving the purpose of reimbursing the resulting deviation in energy consumed/produced. 
Consumption-based resources of FCR are at somewhat of an advantage compared to pro-
duction-based components, because whereas production units require running costs allo-
cated to keeping capacity on line, consumption-based reserves can maintain their availa-
ble capacity within the framework of their normal operation, and ultimately retain up- 
and downregulating capacity without any designated effort, as the capacity is inherently 
available. The FCR-D is especially advantageous in this regard, as consumers are able to 
receive compensation for their willingness to cut off the power supply, despite the likeli-
ness of control being required being relatively low. 
8.1 Frequency Containment Reserves for Normal Operation 
 
Market participators in Finland can choose to either offer their FCR-N capacity to the 
annual market or the hourly market. In the annual market, a fixed price is set for all bids 
activated, which determines the price for all market hours throughout that market year. 
Yearly markets are carried out during the fall, and are not accessible once the initial con-
tracts have been made. The price of FCR-N in the yearly market is determined by the 
highest approved bid. Operators participating in the yearly market are obligated to main-
tain the capacity sold to the yearly market throughout the year within the framework of 
their normal operation. For 2016, 89 MW of capacity took part in the yearly market. The 
compensation for this capacity was 17.42 €/MW. Capacity owners taking part in the 
yearly market receive the fixed price whenever they offer capacity to the reserves. When 
procuring the hourly obligated FCR-N capacity, the yearly market capacity is prioritized 
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first, with all available capacity being ensured participation. Once capacity has been ac-
quired through the yearly market, supplemental reserves are procured through a national 
hourly market. Additional capacity is acquired from Sweden, Russia, Estonia and Nor-
way. Market data for the hourly market for 2016 is shown in figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 
Market data for capacity acquired and respective price in the FCR-N hourly market during 2016 
 
Over the course of 2016, the hourly market was utilized 5658 hours of the year, corre-
sponding to a 64 % utilization factor. The average compensation through the hourly mar-
ket was 26.1 €/MW, and on average 15.6 MW of capacity was procured. The maximum 
price for the year was 104.2 €/MW and the maximum capacity acquired was 56.7 MW. 
In addition to the compensation of reserve capacity provided, an energy compensation is 
also received. The energy compensation cannot be accurately evaluated based on the data 
available for this paper, although it has been stated that the effect it has on the overall 
annual profit is relatively insignificant, and it is therefore left out of results displayed in 
this paper entirely.  
 
The FCR-N market was deployed in 2011. The market has experienced considerable fluc-
tuation during its short history, as demand and supply seek a sustainable balance. A sum-
mary of hourly market values for the years 2012-2016 is summarized in table 5 and re-
spective values in the yearly market are shown in table 6. 
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FCR-N Hourly 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Annual expense M€ 3,1 4,1 8,0 6,7 4,3 
Mean price €/MW 26 29 46 51 45 
Max price €/MW 104 500 520 514 560 
Mean overall capacity MW 16 18 21 14 11 
Max overall capacity MW 57 75 86 64 51 
Hours used N 5658 6780 6097 6135 5952 
Utilization rate 64 % 77 % 70 % 70 % 68 % 
 
Table 5 
Annual values for FCR-N hourly market 
FCR-N Yearly 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Price €/MW 13 17.42 16.21 15.8 14.36 11.97 
Total capacity MW 55 89 73.6 75.4 73.5 72.7 
 
Table 6 
Values for FCR-N Yearly market 
 
The price level of the hourly market increased considerably for the first four years, likely 
due to a limited amount of market participators. Prices have recently dropped, and the 
mean hourly price was roughly half of 2013 values during 2016. It is important to remem-
ber that the hourly market serves the purpose of providing sources of supplemental ca-
pacity when the required capacity is not met through the annual market. 2013 experienced 
prices over 300 % that of the yearly market price. This is naturally not desirable, and the 
proper saturation of the market would lead to prices in the hourly market close to those 
of the annual market, avoiding the unequal compensation of effectively the same provided 
task. 
 
2016 showed signs of increased competition in the hourly market, as the mean price was 
relatively close to the price in the annual market. Unlike previous years, the market did 
not experience high price spikes, with the price remaining below 105 €/MW throughout 
the year, whereas previous years had hours in which prices exceeded 500 €/MW, indicat-
ing an increase of economically efficient supply of reserves.  
 
As the demand for the hourly market is largely effected by the amount of capacity avail-
able through the yearly market, increased participation in the yearly market naturally de-
creases the price level of the hourly market, as less supplemental capacity is required. As 
additional sources of FCR-N are deployed, the price level of the annual market can be 
expected to decrease even further, and assuming the saturation of both markets the hourly 
market prices will continue converging with the price level set in the yearly market. 
 
Developments in the electricity sector are expected to entail a loss in inertia, requiring 
even more rapid reaction to frequency fluctuation. Fingrid, along with associated trans-
mission system operators, are likely to react to these developments by increasing the la-
tency requirements of FCR-N reserves. The increasingly stringent technical requirements 
for FCR-N components may restrict a large portion of currently used reserve units from 
providing the required control. This especially effects hydropower operators, as Kaplan-
turbines have been highlighted as one of the production types most likely unable to meet 
the future requirements. The majority of hydropower plants in Finland are Kaplan-tur-
bines, and if future reserves are implemented in which Kaplan-turbines are not a viable 
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option, consumption-based sources of flexibility may become increasingly valuable (Fin-
grid e). Presumably the control provided through conventional FCR-N providers unable 
to meet future requirements will not be neglected, but rather considered as a separate 
resource, which would allow consumers to compete with comparably rapid forms of con-
trol in a market designated for highly capable sources of flexibility.  
8.2 Frequency Containment Reserves for Disturbances 
FCR-D procurements are made under the same premise as FCR-N, in which the obligated 
capacity is initially pursued through capacity participating in the yearly market, with sup-
plemental capacity available through the hourly market as well as external links to Swe-
den and Norway. The price determined in the yearly market for 2016 was 4.5 €/MW, and 
a total of 367 MW participated in the yearly market. Hourly market data for 2016 is shown 
in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 
Market data for capacity acquired and respective price in the FCR-D hourly market during 2016 
Due to the high availability of yearly market capacity, the utilization of the hourly market 
was low for 2016, with supplemental capacity being procured through the hourly market 
for just 23 % of the market hours. The majority of market hours experienced low prices, 
as over 60 % of the market prices were 10 €/MW or lower. Despite the low mean market 
price, the market is subject to high price spikes, exceeding 100 €/MW. This leads to a 
skewed distribution of profits, in which the most profitable 2 % of hours yielded the same 
profit as the least profitable 67 % in 2016.  
 
Annual values for the FCR-D hourly market are shown in table 7 and values for the yearly 
market are shown in table 8. 
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FCR-D 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Annual expense M€ 1,3 3,1 1,3 3,8 0,5 
Mean price €/MW 20 21 17 32 19 
Max price €/MW 150 500 420 600 480 
Mean overall capacity 
MW 
20 18 13 15 6 
Max overall capacity 
MW 
73 115 74 77 46 
Hours used N 2049 5827 4089 6358 2822 
Utilization rate 23 % 67 % 47 % 73 % 32 % 
 
Table 7 
Annual values for FCR-D hourly market 
FCR-D  2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Total capacity MW 455.7 367 297.5 318.7 299.8 346.9 
Price €/MW 4.7 4.5 4.13 4.03 3.36 2.8 
 
Table 8 
Values for FCR-D yearly market 
 
Along with the FCR-N market, the FCR-D market was also launched in 2011, and has 
experienced volatility in its first years of operation. Although the average price per MW 
in the hourly market has consistently been around 20 €/MW, with the exception of 2013 
which experienced a higher mean price of 32 €/MW, the overall utilization rates have 
varied substantially. The hourly market was used for 23 % of the market hours in 2016 
despite utilization being as high as 73 % in 2013 and 67 % in 2015. This entails a some-
what high uncertainty in assessing possible annual profits in the hourly market, as it is 
difficult to forecast the likelihood of bids being activated. 
The yearly market price has consistently increased, and the large capacity of participators 
in the yearly market is likely to further decrease the utilization of the hourly market. Com-
pared to 2013, which experienced the highest values in the hourly market in terms of 
mean price as well as market utilization, the overall capacity participating the yearly mar-
ket has increased by more than 50%. 
8.3 Balancing Power Market 
Bids are made to the balancing power market separately for up- and downregulation based 
on the system imbalance. If consumption is greater than production, the transmission sys-
tem operator has the possibility of procuring upregulating power through the balancing 
power market. Market operators providing upregulating power carry out upregulation by 
either increasing their production of decreasing their consumption, thereby offsetting the 
system imbalance between the two. Bids are activated based on their bid price, with the 
least expensive bids being the first bids activated. The price received for upregulating 
power is the same for all activated bids, and is equivalent to the highest activated bid, or 
at the bare minimum equivalent to the corresponding Elspot price of the operation hour. 
Activated bids receive compensation based on the total energy provided during the oper-
ation hour. 
 
27 
 
If production is greater than demand, the transmission system operator can sell the surplus 
power to market operators who have bid downregulating power to the balancing power 
market. Downregulation is carried out by either decreasing production or increasing con-
sumption. Downregulation bids are activated in order of most to least expensive, with the 
highest activated bid determining the final market price. The price of downregulating 
power is at most the Elspot market price for the corresponding hour. Figure 12 illustrates 
the functionality of the balancing power market. The balancing power market prices of 
2016 for up- and downregulating power are shown in figures 13 and 14. 
 
 
Figure 12 Operation of the balancing power market (Fingrid h) 
 
 
Figure 13 
Market data for upregulating power in the balancing power market for 2016 
 
Upregulating power was activated through the balancing power market for a total of 1980 
hours during 2016, accounting for a utilization rate of 23 %. The mean price of upregu-
lating power for 2015 was 51.2 €/MWh, and the mean capacity was 58.4 €/MWh/h. The 
price of upregulation is subject to high price spikes, such as the price spike of 3000 
€/MWh experienced on 22.1.2016. The correlation of price and demand is somewhat 
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weak, as several of the peak demand hours did not entail large prices, and correspondingly 
relatively low demands have the potential to cause significant price spikes.  
 
 
Figure 14 
Market data for downregulating power in the balancing power market for 2016 
 
Downregulation provides market operators the possibility to buy surplus energy, allowing 
them to either consume more or produce less than stated in their balance. The price of 
downregulating power for 2016 was 22 €/MWh on average. Downregulation is activated 
somewhat more frequently than upregulation, with bids being activated for a total of 2698 
hours in 2016, accounting for a utilization rate of 34 %. The price of downregulation may 
drop below 0, in which case providers of downregulation are paid for their downregula-
tion. This essentially means that consumers would be paid for consuming electricity, and 
electricity generators would be paid for cutting down production. 2016 experienced a 
minimum price of -25.6 €/MWh. 
 
On 7.5.2017, the price of upregulating power fell to an unprecedented low of -1000 
€/MWh for a period of 4 hours. The demand for downregulation for this period was be-
tween 189 and 444 MWh/h. The irregularly high demand was mainly due to a mainte-
nance break in the transmission line to North Sweden, which would typically provide 
1500 MWh/h in transmission capacity. This occurrence serves as a valid reminder of just 
how vulnerable market prices in Finland are to price spikes when the flexibility of neigh-
bouring countries is not available.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 display information on the behaviour of down- and upregulating power 
respectively in the balancing power market for the years between 2012 and 2016. 
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Upregulation 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Mean price €/MW 51 53 50 61 81 
Max price €/MW 3000 2000 500 2000 2000 
Mean overall capacity 
MW 
58 64 66 65 74 
Max overall capacity MW 445 435 502 721 767 
Hours used N 1980 1963 2088 1850 1851 
Utilization rate 23 % 22 % 24 % 21 % 21 % 
 
Table 9 
Annual values for upregulation in the balancing power market  
 
Downregulation 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Mean price €/MW 22 17 25 32 23 
Minimum price €/MW -26 -5 -1 -67 -8 
Mean overall capacity 
MW 
-59 -71 -67 -57 -66 
Max overall capacity MW -330 -458 -409 -461 -356 
Hours used N 2968 2820 2655 2784 2553 
Utilization rate 34 % 32 % 30 % 32 % 29 % 
 
Table 10 
Annual values for downregulation in the balancing power market  
 
For the purpose of this paper, we consider the participation of consumers in the balancing 
power market as a provider of upregulating power, as this is financially the more valuable 
service. Consumers are assumed to bid upregulating power to the balancing power market 
at a fixed price. If this bid is activated, the consumer provides upregulation for an un-
known duration and receives compensation for the total energy provided in accordance 
to the upregulation price for the corresponding hour. The provided upregulation causes 
an energy deficit in the consumption system, and requires an energy payback to be carried 
out. Although it is assumed that the consumer is capable of delaying the payback effect, 
it is favourable to limit the length of delay periods, as they may entail drawbacks to the 
consumer environment. The payback energy is considered as an imbalance in the con-
sumption balance, for which the consumer is responsible for paying the price of imbal-
ance power. 
 
Whereas production follows a 2-price balance model, consumption follows a 1-price 
model. The significant difference between these models is that the in the case that the 
imbalance accounted for by consumption is in line with the balance requirement of the 
power system, this imbalance is essentially regarded as involuntary participation in the 
balancing power market, adopting the price set by the balancing power market. This is 
beneficial towards consumers, as they are essentially rewarded for imbalances which cor-
respond with a positive impact on the overall power balance of the system, even when 
this effect has not been specifically pursued. The 1- and 2-priced balance models are 
illustrated in figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Required compensation for imbalances in the production balance (2-price) and consump-
tion balance (1-price) (Fingrid f) 
 
The price of imbalance power depends on the usage of balancing power during the oper-
ation power. If upregulating power is required, the market hour is considered as an up-
regulating hour, and the price of imbalances in the consumption balance is determined by 
the upregulation price of the balancing power market. If the payback occurs during a 
downregulating power, the price of imbalance power is determined by the downregulating 
price. If neither upregulation nor downregulation is required, the price is determined by 
the Elspot price. A 0.5 €/MWh volume fee is added to the price of imbalance power in 
the consumption balance.  
8.4 Elspot Market 
The Elspot market is the largest day-ahead market in the world for trading power. In 2013, 
88 % of the total electricity consumption in Nordic countries was traded through the El-
spot market. As stated previously, the merit order effect leads to an increasing rise in 
Elspot-prices as demand increases, offering consumers the possibility to increase the eco-
nomic efficiency of their electricity consumption by transferring electricity from periods 
of high overall demand to periods of lower overall demand, mitigating the demand for 
usage of the most expensive production plants. 
Unlike previous markets, there is no tangible demand for demand side management in the 
Elspot market. Instead, the demand for flexibility is in the conceptual benefit of shifting 
demand. As the market prices are determined in advance, consumers are able to plan the 
adjustment of their consumption based on these prices. By reacting to the price signals 
given by the Elspot market, the load shifting achieves the benefit of decreasing consump-
tion during periods of expensive production, and transferring this consumption to periods 
in which production is more economic. 
 
The relation between price and demand is visualized in figure 16. The production capacity 
utilized in the Elspot market varies substantially seasonally, as various forms of baseload 
production are not used during the summer, as the overall consumption remains low. For 
this reason, prices have been separated based on the season. 
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Figure 16 
2016 Elspot-prices by demand 
 
Consumers carrying out load shifting do so on an hourly time scale, reacting to price 
differences experienced during a day. Hourly prices in the Elspot market follow a diurnal 
pattern, in which prices are highest during morning and evening hours, during which the 
demand for electricity is high. During the night, the demand for electricity is low, and 
Elspot-prices for these hours are regularly significantly lower than the daily peak prices. 
Figure 17 displays the diurnal pattern typically experienced in the Elspot market. Two 
separate price spikes are often experienced, with on occurring during the morning be-
tween the hours of 8 and 12, and the second occurring in the evening during the hours of 
17 and 20. Consumers flexibility during the hours most critical in terms of electricity 
generation are likely to receive the highest reward for carrying out load shifting. In other 
words, the most essential requirement for Elspot-based load shifting is not the technical 
capability of flexible consumption (how the flexibility is carried out), but rather the ability 
to carry out control so that it coincides with the diurnal pattern of market prices (when 
the flexibility is carried out). 
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Figure 17 
2016 hourly Elspot prices  
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9 Economic potential 
The economic potential for each market is primarily assessed by calculating the annual 
profit attained based on 2016 market data. The capacity of the flexible load used was 10 
MW, as this is the lowest capacity capable of theoretically accessing all marketplaces. 
Market participators are assumed to bid the available capacity at a constant bid price for 
all market hours throughout the year. In calculations made on the participation in the 
balancing power market as well as Elspot-based load shifting, the availability of the flex-
ible capacity is constrained by the system balance constraint, which entails that the flex-
ible capacity is not accessible during an energy imbalance within the consumption sys-
tem, thereby requiring the carrying out of the energy payback. For the FCR-N and FCR-
D markets, the system imbalance is not taken into account. It should be noted that if the 
imbalance were properly accounted for, participation in the FCR-N market would likely 
be limited to some degree. 
 
Consumption loads may be restricted from participating in load control due to circum-
stances unrelated to the market participation. These effects have not been accounted for. 
In this sense, the values ae theoretical maximums under the assumptions and constraints 
presented, and actual values are likely to be somewhat smaller due to the consumer loads 
inability to constantly have the flexible capacity available. 
 
Regulation of the considered markets are likely to develop in the near future, which may 
cause drastic changes to the market. These developments are not accounted for, but should 
be kept in mind when considering the accuracy of profit potentials. For the purpose of the 
research carried out, the market analysis aims to provide insight to the proportional mag-
nitude of profit potential rather than precise values. A key aspect in the analysis performed 
was to determine and evaluate the factors which contribute to the profitability of these 
markets. With this in mind, it is not in the interest of this paper to provide accurate eco-
nomic potentials, but rather to provide a conceptual background to the underlying prop-
erties which are most relevant in the pursuit of maximum profitability. 
9.1 Frequency Containment Reserves for Normal Operation 
 
The annual profit of a 10 MW load in the frequency containment reserves for normal 
operation yearly market would have been 1.53 M€, assuming the capacity was available 
the entire year. Annual profits in the FCR-N hourly market for bid prices of 0-50 €/MWh 
are shown in figure 18, as well as the number of activated bids over the course of the year. 
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Figure 18 
Annual profit of FCR-N hourly market as a function of bidding price for 2016 
 
Profits shown in figure 18 are based on the theoretical profit of a market participator that 
had participated in the FCR-N yearly or hourly market. This participator would receive 
compensation based on the hourly market price for all hours in which the bid price was 
lower than the market price. This would lead to a maximum profit at a bidding price of 0 
€/MWh, ensuring that the bid is activated and compensation is received for all hours in 
which the hourly market is utilized. Participation in the FCR-N is likely to entail costs to 
the consumer, for example losses in efficiency, increases in operation and maintenance 
costs, as well as risks related to technical failures. Market participators would be inclined 
to make bids that ensure the received compensation exceeds the attributed costs of par-
ticipation. 
 
The amount of capacity procured through the FCR-N hourly market is quite small, aver-
aging just 16 MW in 2016. If large amounts of additional capacity is introduced to the 
market, this may have a substantial impact on the price level of the market. A highly 
simplified approach to assessing the impact of additional capacity was used, in which the 
bids made for each hour were assumed to be perfectly linear, resulting in a linear price 
drop when additional capacity is introduced. Accurate simulations of price development 
would require significantly more sophisticated models. Although the assumptions made 
in the price drop estimation are not necessarily particularly accurate, the motivation for 
these calculations is to provide insight to how sensitive the markets may be to additional 
capacity. 
 
Implementing the assumption of a linear price decrease would lead to the results shown 
in figure 19. 
35 
 
 
Figure 19 
Annual profit of FCR-N hourly market assuming linear reduction of market pics as a function of 
bidding price for 2016 
 
The effect of the additional capacity is especially evident at low bid prices. This is largely 
due to the high number of market hours in which demand is very small, less than 10 MW, 
in which case the price of an additional bid would dictate the final market price altogether. 
This provides the incentive to bid at a higher price. For the estimations using a linear price 
drop for the year 2016, a bidding price of 8 €/MWh would yield the highest annual profit, 
at 688 k€. Compared to the results in figure 18 in which no price drop was taken into 
account, the results calculated assuming a linear price drop are substantially lower. At 
bidding prices close to 0 €/MW, the annual profit would drop by more than 50 %. While 
this may be somewhat discouraging to market participators, as the economic potential is 
decreased, it is beneficial to the electricity sector as a whole, as the cost of FCR-N is 
reduced. 
 
The annual profit potentials for 2012-2016 were calculated for both the yearly and hourly 
markets without taking the price drop into consideration as well as with a linear price 
drop. Results are shown in table 11. 
 
FCR-N 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Yearly market k€ 
     
Annual profit 1527 1421 1385 1259 1049 
Profit with price drop 1355 1229 1200 1089 905 
Hourly market k€ 
     
Annual profit 1352 1873 2649 2854 2212 
Profit with price drop 688 908 1556 1410 953 
 
Table 11 
Economic potential of participation in frequency containment reserves for normal operation 
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9.2 Frequency Containment Reserves for Disturbance 
 
As in FCR-N markets, the overall demand in FCR-D hourly market is quite low, with the 
average demand in 2016 amounting to 17 MW. In order to estimate the annual profits 
attainable though FCR-D, we again assume that bidding prices progress linearly, leading 
to a substantial drop in prices as new capacity is introduced, as displayed in figures 20 
and 21. 
 
 
Figure 20 
Annual profit of FCR-D hourly market as a function of bidding price for 2016 
 
Compared to the FCR-N market, the utilization of the FCR-D hourly market is consider-
ably less frequent, as the annual market is largely capable of accounting for the entire 
capacity requirement. Bidding capacity at a price of 10 €/MWh would have led to an 
annual utilization rate of less than 12 %, whereas the corresponding utilization in the 
FCR-N market would be roughly 4 times as high. 
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Figure 21 
Annual profit of FCR-D hourly market assuming linear reduction of market pics as a function of 
bidding price for 2016 
 
As shown previously in table 7, the mean demand for FCR-D capacity in the hourly mar-
ket has remained below 20 MW annually since 2012.Due to the limited demand of the 
FCR-D hourly market, additional capacity participating in the market is likely to have a 
large impact on resulting market prices.  
 
FCR-D 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Yearly market k€ 
     
Annual profit 394 362 353 295 245 
Profit with price drop 384 350 342 285 238 
Hourly market k€ 
     
Annual profit 443 1212 637 1743 312 
Profit with price drop 260 622 256 724 86 
 
Table 12 
Economic potential of participation in frequency containment reserves for disturbances 
 
9.3 Balancing Power Market 
 
The profit of the control carried out based on the balancing power market is determined 
by the difference between compensation received from the upregulation and the cost of 
the payback. 
 
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ∗ (𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 −
                        𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡+1+𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦)                                                                      (4) 
 
Participating in the balancing power market is somewhat challenging, as neither the up-
regulation price no cost of imbalance is known by the participator until after the related 
actions have been carried out. This means that control cycles are carried out based on 
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expected values rather than actual values, and realized control cycles are unlikely to cor-
respond with the theoretical optimum, due to the unavailability of information. 
 
The overall profitability is based on the assumption that the expected value of the upreg-
ulation price is greater than the expected value of the cost of imbalance. The expected 
values can be influenced by both the bidding price, 𝐸[𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒] ≥
𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, and by the length of the payback delay. These factors largely dictate the 
operation of the consumer, and are the most relevant factors when developing a market 
strategy. 
 
Because both the upregulation price and cost of imbalance are unknown until after the 
actual control has taken place, there is a risk of a single control cycles being unprofitable, 
when 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡+1+𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 > 𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡.  
 
Figure 22 shows the cost of imbalance power for 26.1.2016, illustrating the potential for 
market participators to carry out control cycles which have a negative profit. 
 
 
Figure 22 
Balancing power market prices for upregulating power for 26.1.2016 
 
We assume a marketing strategy in which the market operator bid upregulating power to 
the market at a bidding price of 50 €/MWh and carried out the payback immediately after 
the initial control was carried out. For the hour of 3-4, the uprgeulating bid would have 
been activated, and the consumer would receive the 65 €/MWh market price for the 
provided upregulation. The cost of imbalance for the following hour was determined by 
the upregulating price, leading to a cost of imbalance of 299 €/MWh. The market 
particiapator would effectively incur a loss of over 230€/MWh for the carried out control. 
These are clearly very unfavorable scenarios for the consumer, as they result in 
considerable financial losses, and they are also detrimental to the entire balancing power 
market, as the initial upregulation is less valuable than the subsequent increase of 
upregulating demand during the payback hour. 
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In order to avoid these scenarios, it is in the best interest of the consumer to maintain high 
bidding prices and delay the payback hour, allowing the market price to develop. If we 
use the market data of 26.1.2016, the optimal bidding price would have been over 65 
€/MWh, and the delay of payback 2 hours. While the market encourages the delay of 
payback, it is important to keep in mind that this may be detrimental to the operation of 
the control component. For this reason, the delay of payback periods cannot be considered 
as arbitrary, but instead as a parameter which should be constrained. Figure 23 shows the 
annual profits accumulated duing 2016 utilzing delay periods of 0, 1 and 2 hours and 
bidding pices of 0-200 €/MWh. Figure 24 shows the number of control cycles required 
in each case. 
 
 
Figure 23 
Annual profits through balancing power markets as a function of bidding price for payback delays 
0, 1 and 2 hours 
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Figure 24 
Activated bids in the balancing power markets as a function of bidding price for payback delays 0, 1 
and 2 hours 
 
The randomness of single cycle profits in the balancing power market encourages risk 
averse bidding strategies. Based on 2016 market data, a reasonable market strategy would 
have been to utilize an 80€/MWh bidding price and 1 hour delay of payback, which would 
have led to a total of just 113 bid activations over the course of the entire year. It seems 
that annual profits rely heavily on the extreme market conditions, with a large share of 
the annual profits coming from isolated price spikes. Out of the profit acquired over the 
course of the entire year, the profit attained through the most profitable cycle which oc-
curred during the 8.1.2016 price spike of 3000 €/MWh accounted for over 24%. More 
than 50% of the total annual profits would have been attainable through the 10 most prof-
itable cycles. An hourly breakdown of single cycle profits is shown in figure 25.  
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Figure 25 
Hourly breakdown of balancing power market profits using a bidding price of 80 €/MWh and pay-
back delay of 1 hour 
 
Based on the results found using 2016 data, participation of consumers in the balancing 
power market is likely to be very limited, as both the interest of mitigating the risk of 
unprofitable control cycles as well as the pursuit of maximum profits with minimal impact 
on the consumer environment favour marketing strategies in which the upregulating po-
tential is reserved for extreme price spikes. 
9.3.1 Elspot-based balancing power market payback 
 
Forecasting the price development of the balancing power market is highly challenging, 
as the very demand of the market itself is based on factors which were not forecasted. 
One simplistic forecasting strategy would be to base payback hours on Elspot prices. The 
rationale behind this strategy is the fact that during hours in which neither up- nor down-
regulation is not used, the price of imbalance power is the Elspot price. However, during 
hours in which regulating power is used, the price of balancing power does not correlate 
strongly with Elspot prices, and therefor there is little upside to using this strategy. Look-
ing at the extreme scenarios that happened during 2016 provides an interesting insight to 
just how unpredictable the balancing power market prices are. The balancing power mar-
ket experienced a historical price spike on 22.1.2016 during the hour from 6-7 AM, reach-
ing a price of 3000 €/MWh. All upregulating bids made to the BPM for that hour were 
activated. The Elspot market price for this hour was 42.75 €/MWh, which is not an ex-
traordinary price for that hour and time of year. 4 hours later, the Elspot price was nearly 
three times what it had been during the balancing power market price spike, while the 
imbalance prices had dropped to less than 5 % of what it had been, to 134.14 €/MWh. 
Figure 26 shows the correlation (or lack thereof) of imbalance prices and Elspot prices 
for 2016. 
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Figure 26 
Balancing power market prices and corresponding Elspot market prices for 2016 
 
It seems that other than the fact that both Elspot and imbalance prices are highest during 
winter periods, it is uncommon for the price spikes to coincide with each other. In fact, 
during the highest Elspot prices of 2016, peaking at 214.32 €/MWh during 21.1.2016 for 
the hour from 9-10, the price of buying imbalance power was very low, at just 29.00 
€/MWh. Interestingly, only 18.33 MWh of downregulation was activated for the given 
hour, which indicates the highly sensitive nature of the market. These extreme scenarios 
serve as a reminder that the factors which dictate price development in the balancing 
power market are very different to those in the Elspot market. 
 
Overall, there is some benefit to following Elspot prices, as a considerable portion of 
payback periods occur during hours where there is no regulation, in which case the price 
of imbalance power is dictated by the Elspot price. Figure 27 shows annual profits using 
a payback strategy in which the payback hour is chosen based on the lowest Elspot price 
within the 6 hours following the upregulation hour. 
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Figure 27 
Annual profits through the balancing power market utilizing Elspot-based payback delay 
 
Compared to the profits made with a predetermined payback delay, the increase in profits 
is moderate, offering at most around 10 k€ more annually. The distribution of delays 
heavily favours longer delay periods, as can be seen in the figure 28. When considering 
the drawback of having extended delay periods, it is unlikely this will be seen as the best 
option for the consumer. 
 
 
Figure 28 
Distribution of payback delay length utilizing Elspot-based payback 
 
Previous research has addressed the challenge of delaying with the payback issue in the 
BPM. Although it presents a challenge to consumers participating in the market, it is 
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hardly the underlying constraint to attaining substantial income. In fact, simulations uti-
lizing perfect knowledge of price development still fall short of the economic potential of 
other marketplaces. Annual profits assuming perfect information are shown in figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29 
Annual profits through bidding of upregulating to the balancing power market assuming the availa-
bility of perfect information for maximum delay periods of 0-6 hours 
 
Due to the random nature of the balancing power market, profit estimations based on 
perfect information are effectively irrelevant, as market participators have no way of at-
taining dependable information. However, it does give some insight to the theoretical 
potential of the market. Simulations were run assuming that market participators would 
have access to nearly perfect market information, allowing them to choose the control 
cycles which would yield the maximum profit over the year. The information was merely 
nearly perfect, as the run time (which of course pays a large part in dictating the compen-
sation) was not known, and therefore assumed to be constant at 0.5 hours, as in previous 
simulations. 
 
Results show that even if perfect information were available, the annual profits do not 
compete with other marketplaces. This is in large part due to the fact that the utilization 
of the upregulation remains low, with upregulation being provided for just a total of 741 
hours in 2016. 
 
The fundamental challenges of participating in the balancing power market make it 
largely unattractive for consumers. Compared to other methods of utilizing control, an-
nual paybacks are modest, while the effect control cycles have on the consumer environ-
ment are substantial. These are largely due to the nature of the balancing power market 
in itself, making them difficult to mitigate through sophisticated market strategies. Future 
developments in the BPM will likely aim to better facilitate the participation of consump-
tion. However, most consumption partaking in the BPM will likely be consumption that 
is not mandatory, allowing participation in the market without the major drawback of the 
uncertainty of imbalance costs and extended periods of energy deficit. Figure 30 shows 
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the annual profit formation from the initial income of the upregulation and cost of pay-
back using a 1 hour delay of payback. 
 
 
Figure 30 
Formation of annual profits (upregulation income – cost of payback) as a function of bidding price 
using a 1 hour delay of payback 
 
9.4 Elspot Market 
 
In calculating the potential profits attainable through Elspot based load shifting, a con-
stant flexible load of the magnitude of 10 MW was assumed to be in use, as in previous 
calculations. This load is essentially a buffer, which the consumer is able to add to or 
decrease from its normal consumption during low market prices, creating a corresponding 
energy imbalance within the load component of 10 MWh. This energy imbalance is ac-
counted for through the payback process, with the control cycle yielding profit relative to 
the difference in prices from the hour the excess electricity was consumed to the hour in 
which consumption was reduced. 
 
Consumers carrying out load shifting are able to do so on their own terms, as the control 
is not regulated in any mater, and is purely incentivized by the consumers ability to alter 
their consumption based on the price signals of the Elspot market. As the control re-
quired has no technical requirements other than the ability to alter consumption, the 
impact of Elspot-based load shifting on the consumer is determined by the system en-
ergy imbalance caused by the control. In order to properly manage the impact of the 
system imbalance, consumers are likely to limit the length of control and length of pay-
back delay in order to limit the magnitude of the imbalance as well as the length of 
imbalance. 
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The single cycle profit of carrying out load shifting is determined as  
 
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ ∆𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                       (5) 
 
If consumption is initially decreased, ∆𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is determined as 
 
  ∆𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1+𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦          (6) 
 
Alternatively, consumption can be initially decreased, in which case ∆𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is 
determined as 
 
      ∆𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  −𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1+𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦           (7) 
 
The overall profit over an extended period does not depend on whether consumption in 
initially decreased of increased, but this has a significant impact on the imbalance caused. 
Naturally, carrying out the consumption increase initially will cause an energy surplus in 
the energy system, which may be favourable to the consumer. Additionally, payback pe-
riods were found to be shorter if consumption was initially increased, as the time required 
for prices to increase to a local maximum from a local minimum is shorter than the time 
required for prices to drop from a local maximum to a local minimum. 
 
Using 2016 prices, a maximum theoretical profit of 119 k€ was found for the 10 MW 
flexible load. A total of 1291 control cycles were required to reach this profit. When con-
sidering the most likely market strategy, there are certain constraints which are likely to 
cause consumers to choose a different strategy to the maximum profit strategy. A weak-
ness of maximizing annual profits is that this strategy utilizes even the slightest variations 
in Elspot prices, often leading to rather insignificant increases in profits. This is illustrated 
in the figure 31, which shows the profit curve of singular control cycles. 
 
 
Figure 31 
Profit curve of Elspot-based load shift cycles for maximum profits 
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The control profit curve shows that a small number of control cycles provide substantial 
profits, while the majority of control cycles provide only a marginal profit increase. For 
the control strategy providing maximum profits, only 166 of the 1291 control cycles are 
require to attain half of the total annual profits. As consumers are likely to aim to restrict 
the number of control cycles carried out, a constraint may be introduced which sets a 
requirement to the profit increase provided by a single control cycle. This constraint can-
not however be introduced on its own, as it affects the nature of the control cycles, mainly 
the length of delay periods between load shifts. The histogram below shows delay periods 
required for the maximum profit case, with a delay period of 0 meaning that the load is 
shifted form one hour to the following hour. 
 
 
Figure 32 
Distribution of payback delay length in Elspot market for maximum profit 
 
The distribution of delays displayed in figure 32 is quite favourable, as the majority of 
delays are less than 6 hours, and do not exceed 9 hours at any point. Thanks to the avail-
ability of perfect information, the control cycles can be sequenced in a way that crates an 
energy surplus in the control environment, rather than an energy deficit. This is often 
favourable to consumers, as it does not limit the functionality of a thermal load. However, 
as discussed earlier, an energy surplus entails greater heat transfer losses, and the delay 
period must be constrained to mitigate this effect. 
 
Based on these factors, profits were calculated using a more viable market strategy, in 
which a minimum cycle profit constraint was introduced as well as a maximum delay 
constraint, ensuring that the losses caused by the delay periods are limited. Figure 33 
shows annual profits as well as the number of control cycles required to gain these profits 
using minimum control profits of 0 to 20 €/MWh. The maximum delay period was set to 
12 hours. 
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Figure 33 
Annual profit through Elspot-based load shifting as a function of single cycle minimum profit 
 
The number of control cycles decreases rapidly as the minimum control profit is in-
creased, while the effect on profits a far less substantial. Comparing results using a 10 
€/MWh minimum to a 0 €/MWh minimum, we see that the profits decrease by 19 %, 
while the number of control cycles required drops by 68 %. The number of required con-
trol cycles in this case was 416. If we assume that under normal operation the consump-
tion would be carried out as a constant load, the load shifting would reduce the energy 
cost of electricity by 9.7 %. The relative overall savings would be only roughly a third of 
this, as the payments made for transmission and taxes, which make up roughly two thirds 
of the final electricity bill of consumers, are based on overall consumption and would 
therefore not decrease as a results of the load shifting under current regulation. 
 
While the limitation of control cycles encourages implementing a minimum cycle profit 
constraint, this would have an impact on the length of delay periods. Figure 34 shows the 
distribution of delay periods resulting from a minimum cycle profit of 10 €/MWh and 
figure 35 shows the corresponding distribution using a 20 €/MWh minimum single cycle 
profit.  
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Figure 34 
Distribution of payback delay length utilizing 10 €/MWh minimum single cycle profit  
 
 
Figure 35 
Distribution of payback delay length utilizing 20 €/MWh minimum single cycle profit  
 
Although the average delay period increases slightly as the minimum single cycle profit 
is increased, this cannot directly be considered an inconvenience. Comparing the 10 
€/MWh distribution to the distribution in which no single cycle profit constraint was used 
we see that although the 10 €/MWh market strategy is more likely to require delay periods 
of 3-6 hours, the total number of cycles requiring these delay periods is in fact less than 
in the 0 €/MWh case. The distributions show that increasing the minimum cycle profit 
does not in fact cause an increase in delay periods, but rather cuts down on the number of 
short cycles, which causes the increase in average delay periods. This favours consumers 
unable to maintain energy deviation for extended periods of time, as a 6 h payback delay 
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is sufficient for carrying out most control cycles regardless of the minimum cycle profit 
constraint. 
 
9.5 Combining multiple markets 
 
FCR-N is by far the most profitable market for consumers to utilize flexible consumption 
loads. However, due to the stringent demands it sets for the control capability, the major-
ity of flexible loads are unlikely to be qualified for FCR-N markets. Participation in FCR-
D and the balancing power market as well as Elspot-based control are less demanding 
from the consumers point of view, and a large capacity of loads are likely to be eligible 
to participate in all of these markets. As the markets are not strictly contradictory, it is 
possible for consumers to concurrently participate in all 3. In practice this would mean 
that consumers would initially bid the available capacity to the FCR-D markets, for which 
the profit per control cycle is high. Consumers receive verification of the bid activations 
for a given market day the preceding evening, after which the hours that are not desig-
nated to FCR-D can be utilized for Elspot based control. The market hours in which the 
flexible load is not being utilized in either of these markets (including the payback peri-
ods), flexible capacity can be offered to the balancing power market. 
 
The market strategy used for Elspot based controls utilized a minimum control profit of 
10 €/MWh and maximum payback delay of 12 hours. The market strategy for the balanc-
ing power market was to bid capacity at 50 €/MWh and have a uniform delay of 1 hour 
before the payback hour. The breakdown of profits from each of these markets and be 
seen in figure 36.  
 
Figure 36 
Hourly profits through combined participation in FCR-D, Elspot and balancing power market 
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Profits  k€ Cycles N Total hours  h 
FCR-D 221 850 850 
Elspot 84 356 2133 
BPM 14 80 240 
total 319 1286 3223 
 
Table 13 
Composition of annual profits through combined participation in FCR-D, Elspot and balancing 
power market 
 
The combination of multiple markets provides substantial profits. Because the capacity 
is initially offered to the FCR-D market, the profit potential for FCR-D is fully utilized. 
As the utilization factor for the FCR-D hourly market is small, less than 10 %, the capacity 
was available for use in the Elspot market for the majority of the year, resulting in con-
siderable profits. The profits accumulated through Elspot markets increase annual profits 
by 38 %. Elspot based control cycles required an average of 6 hours for the initial down-
regulation delay of payback and payback hour. The lengthiness of Elspot-based load shift-
ing significantly limits the possibility of providing upregulation power to the balancing 
power market.  Over the course of the year, upregulation was provided for a total of 80 
hours, accounting for a profit increase of 14 k€. This is equivalent to a 6 % increase 
compared to participating solely in the FCR-D market. In total, profits from the combine 
market participation are 319 k€, 44 % more than the FCR-D only case. This falls below 
the current profitability of the FCR-D yearly market, which indicates the lack of initiative 
provided to consumers to participate in both the Elspot market and balancing power mar-
ket. 
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10 Impact of market participation 
 
This section aims to provide an assessment of the benefit achieved through the participa-
tion of consumers in the discussed markets. The desired impact of integrating consump-
tion as market operators is to increase the economic and technical efficiency of the elec-
tricity sector. Evaluating these benefits is a difficult task, as the operation of the electricity 
system is highly multi- dimensional and subject to changes based on a multitude of fac-
tors. Analysis based on current market structures and prices may lose relevance as these 
markets are developed. However, the provided analysis aims to provide insight to the 
factors that currently impact the technical effectiveness of consumption-based control, as 
well as assess the potential magnitude of economic benefits. 
10.1  Frequency Containment Reserves 
The system benefit of utilizing consumption in FCR markets is mainly financial. As re-
serve capacities are predetermined on a national level, introducing additional capacity 
does not increase the amount of reserves in use. Instead, adding new sources of FCR 
would substitute the more expensive FCR units currently in use. The impact of additional 
capacity depends on the difference in functionality (reliability) as well as cost compared 
to the sources it would replace. If we assume that DSM-based reserves maintain the same 
reliability as the component they are substituting, the benefit is purely financial. Annually 
the procurement of FCR-N has come at a cost 18-28 M€, or 0.22-0.33 €/MWh, and the 
FCR-D procurement has entailed costs of 10-14 M€, or 0.12-0.16 €/MWh. Introducing 
consumption to the FCR markets at low market prices can decrease the cost of FCR pro-
curements, and cut back on balance service and grid service costs, which are used to fi-
nance the procurement of reserves. This will cause a marginal decrease on the price of 
electricity to consumers. Although the realized decrease is somewhat insignificant, the 
price volatility of FCR markets can be considered a notable risk, especially considering 
future developments of the market structure, and mitigating this risk can consequently be 
seen as a valuable service. (Fingrid g) 
 
When it comes to the procurement of FCR, Finland is highly dependent on the availability 
of reserves through external links. In 2013, Russia/Estonia, Sweden, and Norway ac-
counted for 22 %, 22 %, and 8 % respectively of the total procurements of FCR-N, ac-
counting for a combined 52 % of the overall payments made. In the procurement of FCR-
D for 2013, Sweden received 29 % of the total funds used, and Norway received 5 %. 
(Fingrid i) Consumers provide a domestic resource for both FCR-N and FCR-D, which 
would increase the self-sufficiency of the Finnish electricity sector. 
10.2  Balancing Power Market 
When consumption loads offer upregulating power to the balancing power market, they 
provide a valuable service in reducing the power imbalance during the operation hour. 
However, as the consumption system ultimately requires the provided electricity to be 
consumed, the component unit does not effectively offer upregulating power, but rather 
transfers the demand for upregulation to a later period, operating under the assumption 
that the value of upregulating power during the initial control hour is greater than during 
the payback hour. Ultimately the value of the provided control is therefore not guaranteed 
through the palpable value provided during the operation hour, but is instead determined 
by the value provided in postponing upregulation from the hour in which the consumer 
provides upregulation to the hour in which it carries out the energy payback. 
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In the best case scenario, the payback hour occurs during a downregulating hour, in which 
case the payback would effectively be beneficial to the overall state of the market. If the 
payback hour requires neither up-or downregulating power, the payback can be consid-
ered to have a negligible effect on the market. However, if the payback occurs during 
another upregulation hour, it is questionable whether the provided control was of value. 
In the worst case, the price of upregulation during the payback hour is greater than during 
the initial upregulation, leading to a financial loss on behalf of the consumer while also 
incurring additional strain on the balancing power market. It should also be considered 
that the added demand for upregulation during the payback hour by the market operator 
should be taken into account, although due to the difficulty of simulating balancing power 
market prices this is not accounted for in this paper. 
 
The fact that the participation in the balancing power market is profitable entails that the 
provided service is in fact of value, 𝐸[𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛] >
𝐸[𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒]. However, the somewhat minimal profit potential raises question 
over just how much is achieved through postponing the upregulation demand. In order to 
provide further insight to this subject, the state of the balancing power market was ob-
served for the potential payback hours. Results for 2016 are shown in figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 37 
Probability of payback hour occurring during an upregulating market hour (solid line) and down-
regulating hour (dashed line) 
 
The solid lines represent the probability of the payback occurring during an upregulating 
hour and the dashed lines represent the probability of the payback occurring during a 
downregulating hour. When payback hours are not delayed, the probability of the market 
experiencing an upregulating hour during payback is over 70 % for all bidding prices, 
indicating that upregulation periods primarily last for multiple hours. Delaying payback 
by one or two hours leads to a considerable drop in the probability of the payback occur-
ring during an upregulating hour, and the probability of the payback occurring during a 
downregulating hour becomes substantial. The probabilities show that if payback is not 
delayed, it is unlikely the provided control is beneficial, whereas slightly longer periods 
of delay are much more probable to prove to be valuable. 
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The worst case scenario for consumers acting in the Elspot market is for the cost of pay-
back to be more expensive than the income received for provided upregulation. This is 
problematic for the market participator, leading to financial losses, while also causing 
additional strain on the balancing power market, as the provided control ultimately leads 
to increasing the difficulty of providing balancing power. In figure 39 the probability of 
a single control cycle being unprofitable is shown for the delay periods of 0, 1 and 2 
hours. 
 
 
Figure 38 
Probability of single cycle being unprofitable (payback cost > upregulating compensation) 
 
A considerable share of cycles are ultimately disadvantageous when carried out without 
the delay of payback. Even when payback periods are delayed by one or two hours, the 
likelihood of a control cycle being unprofitable remains a significant risk unless the bid-
ding price is high. Based on 2016 market values, the risk of unprofitable control cycles 
would be largely avoided by using a two hour delay of payback periods at a bidding price 
of at least 100 €/MWh. Under these constraints, the likelihood of control cycles entailing 
losses is less than 6 %, while the likelihood for the best case scenario in which the payback 
period occurs during a downregulating hour is over 18 %. 
 
Overall, operation in the balancing power market is clearly prone to the risk of provided 
control entailing less provided benefit than the hindrance caused by the payback. Based 
on the results shown here, it is arguable that the service provided by consumers in the 
balancing power market in postponing upregulating demand is unlikely to provide a sus-
tainable valuable service, and under the assumptions made in the framework of this paper, 
consumers are unlikely to succeed in the current balancing power market when obligated 
to carry out the energy payback. 
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10.3  Elspot Market 
 
Unlike the previously discussed markets, Elspot-based control does not necessarily re-
quire active participation in the Elspot market. Instead, consumers have the possibility to 
use an Elspot-based contract, and autonomously consume electricity in a manner that 
yields the best economic savings. As the amount of electricity procured though the Elspot 
market is massive, the effect of singular consumers does not have an effect on the market. 
However, as demand-side management becomes more accessible and gains popularity, 
these effects may have substantial impacts on the Elspot market.  
 
Consumers participating in the Elspot market-based DSM do so in order to gain a finan-
cial benefit, and base their actions solely on the state of the market. By definition, the 
impact of Elspot-based load shifting is decreased consumption during hours in which the 
price of electricity is high, and the subsequent increase of consumption during hours in 
which the price of electricity is low. This in itself can be seen as a valuable service. How-
ever, this benefit is not always as trivial as it may seem, and this section aims to provide 
a more detailed analysis of how the participation in Elspot-based demand-side manage-
ment may affect the demand curve on a national level. 
 
The nature of consumption loads considered in this paper are typically part of the base 
consumption load, as thermal loads are effectively used constantly in order to maintain 
cooling or heating. The amount of capacity available for load shifting was set as 5 % of 
the daily base load, with the base load being approximated as the daily minimum load. 
This is a large quantity of capacity, ranging from 218 to 647 MW, with an average of 418 
MW. Although these values will likely not be met for some time, they provide a substan-
tial enough impact on the system for proper analysis. The effect control cycles would 
have on the demand load were calculated by calculating hourly averages for demand with 
and without the demand-side management. 
 
The criteria set by the consumer have a sizable effect on the impact of DSM control on 
the demand curve, and are subject to review when assessing these impacts. Results were 
calculated using a market strategy incorporating a 10 MW/h minimum cycle profit and 
maximum 12 hour delay period. Hourly national consumption averages are shown in 
figure 40. 
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Figure 37 
Annual averages for hourly electricity demand with and without Elspot-based load shifting utilizing 
minimum 10 €MWh single cycle profit 
 
The effect of DSM is quite significant during night hours, primarily the hours form 3-4 
and 4-5, for which the DSM load is considerably higher than normal, as well as for morn-
ing peak hours, primarily the hours from 9 -10 an 10-11, in which the DSM loads are 
substantially lower than normal. This is to be expected, as these periods often experience 
the daily maximum and minimum prices. On average, there is a nearly 18 €/MWh differ-
ence in the price from the market hour 4-5 to the market hour 9-10. A less significant shift 
in loads can be seen in the afternoon peak, with the hours from 15-17 receiving slightly 
larger demand loads than normal from the DSM, and the hours 18-20 experiencing 
slightly smaller demand. 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the DSM, it is necessary to define the desired im-
pact. One of the primary desired impacts is a decrease in peak loads. In some sense, the 
simulated DSM effect can be seen as positive, as many of the peak demand hours expe-
rience smaller loads on average, while hours of low demand, during which ample capacity 
is likely to be available, experience higher demand. However, the average peak load is 
not significantly affected, dropping from 9.99 GW to 9.92 GW. This is largely due to the 
fact that while the peak demand typically spans for a period of 2-4 hours, the DSM will 
only affect one of these hours. In light of receiving maximum payment for load shifting, 
consumers have no incentive to spread out the up-and downregulation of consumption, 
but are rather inclined to fully commit to the singular hours which yield the highest mar-
gin. 
 
This is evident in figure 39. While the hour from 9-10 typically experiences the same 
amount of demand as the hour from 12-13, the load is far more likely to be shifted away 
from the hour from 9-10, as prices are considerably higher for this period. This results in 
a considerable drop in demand for the hour from 9-10, while the demand for the hour 
from 12-13 is largely unaffected. This ultimately means that although sections of the peak 
demand are cut down, the overall effect on the peak demand is small. 
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Although Elspot prices depend strongly on the overall demand, the merit order effect, 
which entails that prices increase more aggressively as demand is increased, may lead to 
scenarios in which relatively insignificant development in demand may cause drastic de-
velopments in the Elspot price. These exaggerated price signals may lead to undesired 
load shifting. An example of this can be seen on 8.1.2016 illustrated in figure 41, during 
which the electricity demand was very high throughout the day, ranging from 1290 MW 
to 1530 MW. 
 
 
Figure 38 
Hourly electricity demand with and without Elspot-based load shifting utilizing minimum 10 €MWh 
single cycle profit for 8.1.2016 
 
Although the increase in consumption loads between the market hour for 14-15 and the 
market hour from 18-19 is almost negligible, at just 2.7 %, the difference in prices is quite 
massive, exceeding 150 %. Consumers inclined to utilize load shifting base on Elspot 
prices would naturally use this price difference to their advantage, causing an increase in 
demand in the hour from 14-15. An increase in demand equal to 5 % of the base load 
during this hour would result in a demand higher than the peak consumption for the entire 
year of 2016, a result which can hardly be considered as desirable. Figure 40 also illus-
trates the dilemma of consumers being encouraged to designate their available capacity 
to singular price peak hours, rather than distribute the control over the span of the peak 
and low demand periods, which are considerably longer than the peak periods experi-
enced in market price. 
 
It is important to note that certain factors such as the wind power production and cross-
border transmission capacities can cause large variations in price without changes in de-
mand. However, for the 8.1.2016 case, the availability of imported capacity as well as the 
availability of wind power were virtually identical for the hours in question. 
 
The underlying dilemma is that the price difference between potential load shifting hours 
does not reflect the difference in consumption between the two hours. In this sense, the 
price difference between two hours does not portray the magnitude of load shifting de-
mand. The price curve of electricity becomes increasingly steep as demand increases, and 
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at high demands seemingly marginal differences in demand may often cause drastic price 
changes, a result of the merit order effect. When the overall demand of electricity is high, 
minor differences in demand may entail major price differences. If a large share of con-
sumer loads are shifted based on Elspot prices, radical price increases may be misunder-
stood as a high demand for load shifting, although this is not always the case, leading to 
cases in which the supply for load shifting is based on the perceived demand, which is 
high, when in reality it may be very small. This misinterpretation poses the risk for over-
compensating for the demand difference, which would cause additional strain to electric-
ity generators rather than alleviating it. The negative correlation between the value of load 
shifting and the conceptual demand for load shifting does not directly cause a problem if 
the capacity of load shifting consumers is small. However, if substantial quantities of 
consumption loads are implemented, the risk of overreacting to price signals may become 
significant. 
 
10.3.1 Impact on demand fluctuation 
Based on the results shown above, although load shifting may indeed lead to a decrease 
in peak hour consumption, it may often lead to abrupt changes in the demand curve. When 
considering the generation of electricity, this volatility is problematic, as it entails the 
ramping up and down of power generation. In light of this fact, it is reasonable to favour 
demand curves with less volatility. The nature of Elspot based DSM does not support this 
goal, due to the fact that consumers are likely to shift consumption from one specific hour 
to another, resulting in irregular fluctuations in the demand curve. 
 
To illustrate the rate of changes in the demand load, a differential value was calculated to 
indicate the average change in demand between consecutive hours. Results are shown in 
figure 42. The value used to determine the smoothness of the demand curve was calcu-
lated using the formula below. 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  =
1
𝑁−1
∑ |𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖−1 |
𝑁
1=2                                    (8)                                          
 
Figure 39 
Mean differential of consecutive electricity demand as a function of minimum single cycle profit uti-
lized in Elspot-based load shifting for 2016 
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When flexible consumer react to low price variations, the increase in demand fluctuation 
is substantial, with the mean demand differential between consecutive hours increasing 
from 175 MW to 330 MW. The fluctuation of demand decreases as load shifting is re-
served for period with higher price differences. However, as discussed previously, the 
price differences do not correlate with the capacity differences, and load shifting entails 
the risk of overcompensating for the capacity differences even at high price differences. 
An additional factor accounting for the large fluctuation of demand curves due to load 
shifting is the concentration of load shifts to short periods, in this case 1 hour. As prices 
overemphasize differences in demand, hours of minimum and maximum prices are likely 
to have similar demand as the hours directly preceding and following these hours, and 
substantially increasing or decreasing demand for one of the given hours leads to in-
creases in fluctuation. 
 
10.3.2 Impact on balancing power market 
One of the most crucial factors in a well-functioning electricity system is that ability to 
accurately forecast both demand and generation, enabling electricity producers to prepare 
available production capacity. If consumers are inclined to deviate from their normal con-
sumption patterns, accounting for these deviations may cause additional challenges for 
balance responsible parties in accurately accruing electricity. The difficulty of taking into 
account the effect Elspot prices may have on demand is increased by the fact that ac-
counting for the presumed load shifts has an effect on the realized prices of the market, 
which ultimately dictate the load shifting. This recursive interaction may be difficult for 
market operators to forecast, especially when consumers may base their load shifting on 
a variety of different strategies. 
 
The impact of failing to account for the impact of load shifting on demand curves is dif-
ficult to gauge. However, certain expectations can be made as to how this may affect the 
imbalances of balance settlements and more importantly the consequences of the imbal-
ances on the balancing power market. 
 
If the capacity of load shifting is assumed to be marginal, the impact of imbalances on 
the market party are likely to be small, as they would receive downregulating power dur-
ing the low-price periods at prices close to the low Elspot price of that hour, and corre-
spondingly be able to sell upregulating power during peak prices, receiving compensation 
often close to the high Elspot price of that hour. This would results in an income for the 
market party, as the value of the sold upregulating power is higher than the downregulat-
ing power procured. The overall cost to the market party is determined by the difference 
between the amount of income lost due to the consumer load shifting and the income 
received through the resulting imbalances. 
 
However, prices in the balancing power market are sensitive to considerable changes even 
at low capacities. If a low price hour were to experience consumption well above the 
forecasted amount, the demand for imbalance power would increase substantially, which 
may lead to high prices for imbalance power. Likewise an unexpected decrease in con-
sumption for peak price hours would lead to substantial amount of surplus capacity. As it 
is unlikely that there would be a corresponding demand for upregulation, the value of the 
upregulation would decrease considerably. 
 
As the magnitude of the Elspot market far exceeds the capacity of the balancing power 
market, systematic deviations in consumption caused by consumers reacting to the Elspot 
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prices may lead to extensive increases in demand in the balancing power market. These 
deviations present a risk to the economic operation of the balance responsible party, and 
may cause further strain to electricity generators, as additional flexibility is required to 
account for the increase in forecast errors caused by load shifting. 
 
For these reasons it is imperative for BRPs to play an active role in the load shifting of 
the consumers they are responsible for, ensuring that the effect of load shifting does not 
cause a burden on the balancing power market. This requires BRPs to develop methods 
of accurately aggregating and determining the effect load shifting, a feat best achieved by 
actively participating in the operation of the demand-side management.  
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11 Conclusions 
In this thesis the potential for consumers to utilize flexible consumption in the currently 
available marketplaces has been reviewed. The main objective of the research carried out 
was to determine whether current market structures provide the means to fulfil the targets 
set for demand-side management as a productive component in the energy system of Fin-
land. The research method consisted of a market review based on actual market data from 
2016 for the frequency containment reserves for normal operation, frequency contain-
ment reserves, balancing power market and Elspot market. The analysis aimed to deter-
mine the market potential of these respective markets, optimal market strategies, as well 
as analysis on various constraints that effect the results. By comparing the impacts in-
volvement in these markets would have on the energy system, the effectiveness of the 
market strategies was assessed. 
 
From the consumers point of view, FCR-N markets provide the best possible profit po-
tential, ranging from 70 to 280 k€/MW annually. This market is technically demanding, 
and therefore only attainable for a restricted share of flexible loads. FCR-D markets pro-
vide attractive profit potential, ranging from 25-170 k€/MW annually. Although the mar-
ket requires very fast activation, it is a potential marketplace for large shares of consump-
tion. The effectiveness of FCR-markets is secured through their functionality, which is to 
directly manage the control of consumption to be beneficial to the stability of the grid. 
Additional participation of consumers in the FCR-N and FCR-D markets is likely to cut 
down on the cost of procuring reserves, while also reducing the volatility of the hourly 
market and increasing the self-sufficiency of providing reserves. 
 
The balancing power market offers modest profit potential, around 3-6 k€/MW. By par-
ticipating in the balancing power market, consumers aim to improve the availability of 
upregulating power, and thereby compensate for energy imbalances. A consumer’s ability 
to succeed in this task is subject to scrutiny, as the unpredictability of the state of the 
market leads to considerable uncertainty in terms of the benefit provided by control cy-
cles. Consumers bound by the payback requirement are likely to struggle in providing a 
sustainable service through the balancing power market, and due to the high risk aversion 
required in managing the impacts of the payback effect, consumption based upregulation 
is unlikely to be utilized regularly. 
 
Elspot-based control offers a somewhat attractive profit margin, ranging from 10-12 
k€/MW. By performing Elspot-based load shifting, consumers can potentially decrease 
peak loads. This paper has highlighted various factors that may hinder the effectiveness 
of these controls. In order for the potential Elspot-based load shifting to be reached, mar-
ket mechanisms must be developed that incentivize market strategies that are in line with 
the desired impacts. Current market structures may lead to undesired load profiles as well 
as increase the demand for balancing power, as the accuracy of demand forecasts is de-
creased. In order to sustainably incorporate load shifting without entailing risks to BRPs,  
more sophisticated management of load shifting is required, capable of adequately taking 
into account the effect of demand-side management in Elspot-trading. 
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